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Pro Se
Exclusionary Rule:

Reasonable
Remarks on
Unreasonable
Search and Seizure
By Yale Kamisar
Can we live with the so-called exclusionary rule, which bars the use of illegally gained evidence in criminal
trials? Can the Fourth Amendment live
without it?
A growing number of lawyers and
judges, including Chief Justice Warren
Burger, have called for abandonment of
the rule, usually on the ground that it
has not prevented illegal searches and
seizures and on the ground that the rule
has contributed significantly to the increase in crime.
No one has convincingly demonstrated a causal link between the high
rate of crime in America and the exclusionary rule, and I do not believe that
any persuasive evidence of such a relationship exists.
In the 1950-59 decade, the decade immediately before the U.S. Supreme
Court imposed the exclusionary rule on
the states as a matter of federal constitutional law, crime increased much faster in many states that admitted illegally
seized evidence than in the District of
Columbia, whose law enforcement ofYale Kamisar is professor of law at the
University of Michigan. He is coauthor
of Modern Criminal Procedure and
The Sum and Substance of Criminal
Procedure. This summary of his position on the exclusionary rule is reprinted with permission from the Detroit
Free Press. An extended debate on the
issue between Professor Kamisar and
Malcolm R. Wilkey, ajudge of the U.S.
Court ofAppeals for the Districtof Columbia Circuit, appeared in Judicature
magazine, in the August andNovember
1978 issues and in the February,March,
and April 1979 issues.
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ficers had long been subject to the exclusionary rule.
The Michigan experience is illuminating. The Michigan Constitution contained a so-called anti-exclusionary rule
provision that permitted the use in
evidence of dangerous weapons seized
outside the dwelling house -regardless
of how they were seized. Until this proviso was struck down in 1970, the great
majority of state judges treated it as
valid.
Thus, as a practical matter, until
1970 the police of Michigan were free to
search for and seize firearms of all types
on the street without "probable cause"
or any cause at all.

rule. The Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution says: "The right of
the people to be secure ... against

unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated." There are similar
provisions in every state constitution.
We say it, but do we mean it?
The Fourth Amendment's guarantee
does not explicitly say what the consequences of violation should be. In 1914
the Supreme Court set forth the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States
in an effort to see that the Fourth
Amendment provision would not be ignored. The exclusionary rule, however,
was applied only to federal prosecutions. It excluded evidence obtained by
federal officers in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
It was not until 1961, in Mapp v.
Ohio, that the court imposed the rule on
state courts. It had become convinced
that no meaningful alternative had
emerged in the more than 20 states that
still admitted illegally seized evidence.
The Mapp decision is generally regarded as the beginning of the Warren
Court's "revolution"
in American
criminal procedure. Understandably,
therefore, it, and even the 1914 Weeks
doctrine itself, have become principal
targets of the "counter-revolution" in
American criminal procedure that has

But from 1961 to 1970, the number of
unregistered handguns increased dramatically, firearm robberies doubled,
and homicides committed with firearms
increased fourfold. (In recent years,
both the Michigan homicide rate and
robbery rate have fallen substantially.)
Critics of the exclusionary rule sometimes sound as if it is the main loophole
in the administration of justice. But in
reality it is only a minor escape route in
a system that filters out many more offenders through the discretion of police, prosecutors, and the courts than it
tries, convicts, and sentences.
In my judgment it would be a grave
mistake to abandon the exclusionary

set in since the late 1960s.
The attack on the exclusionary rule
has been led by Chief Justice Burger. At
first, he tempered his sharp criticism of
the rule by pointing out that he would
not welcome its demise until there could

be developed some alternative (such as
an administrative remedy against the
government itself to afford compensation and restitution for victims of
Fourth Amendment violations).
More recently, however, the chief justice has expressed a readiness to scrap
the rule without waiting for alternatives
to emerge. For him (and perhaps for a
majority of the present court), the rule
results in "the release of countless guilty criminals" and has become unbearable.
Judging from their increasingly
gloomy and bitter dissents, the two
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"holdovers" from the old Warren
Court majority, Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, fear (and
many Supreme Court watchers are predicting) that a majority of the present
court will soon abandon the rule altogether, or at least drastically revise it to
provide for exclusion only where the
police have acted not only unlawfully,
but also in "bad faith" or "flagrantly"
or "recklessly."
The exclusionary rule has not had as
great an impact on the police as some
had hoped (and others had feared).
For one thing, the rule has no direct
impact on substantial police activities
directed to ends other than the formal
prosecution and conviction of offenders; for example, harassment, physical
abuse, and unnecessary destruction of
property. This is a good reason to supplement the rule, not to abandon it.
The rule demonstrates to law enforcement officers and to the general public
that the courts are committed to the
principles of the Fourth Amendment so
that when the police themselves break
the law neither they nor any other government agency will be allowed to use
the benefits that flow from the violation.
Otherwise, it would be difficult for the
average citizen-and the average policeman-to believe that the government really meant to forbid the conduct
in the first place.
The government's protestations of
disapproval of police illegality cannot
be taken seriously, observed Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes in his famous
dissent in the 1928 Olmsteadcase, "if it
knowingly accepts and pays and announces that in the future it will pay for
the fruits" of this illegality.
"No distinction," he insisted, "can
be taken between the government as
prosecutor and the government as
judge. If the existing code does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in
such dirty business, it does not permit
the judge to allow such inequities to succeed."
I doubt that I ever fully appreciated
the force of Holmes's views until about
15 years ago, when an incident occurred

in Minnesota, where I was then teaching. Because Minnesota had admitted
illegally seized evidence until 1961, the
Supreme Court's decision that year
caused much grumbling in police ranks.
At a panel discussion in which I participated, the point was made-and perhaps this is the most basic point of
all-that if the police feared that evidence they were gathering in the customary manner would now be excluded,
they must have been violating the guarantee against search and seizure all
along. This evoked illuminating responses from the two law enforcement
officials on the panel.
The Minneapolis city attorney denied that the police had been violating
the law all along; his explanation was
that "the courts of our state were telling
the police all along that the exclusionary rule didn't apply in Minnesota."
This peculiar way of viewing illegal
police conduct was echoed by a St. Paul
detective on the same panel. "No officer lied upon the witness stand," he
explained. "If you were asked how you
got your evidence, you told the truth.
You had broken down a door or pried
open a window. Oftentimes we picked
locks.... The judiciary okayed it; they
knew what the facts were."
There is no reason to think that the
Minnesota experience is unique. The
heads of the New York City and Los
Angeles police departments, for example, also reacted to the adoption of the
exclusionary rule as if the guarantees
against unreasonable search and seizure had just been written.
Are the police not likely to react to the
scrapping of the rule as if the guarantees had just been deleted? Are they not
likely to feel that once again "the
judiciary is okaying it?"
Pro Se is a regular column of opinion
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